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Case Study Paper 
Human Rights and Environmental Justice: Cases from Countries and the Field 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on Antarctica and its status as a commons area with potential to facilitate 
both the human rights objectives and development agendas of global south states.  It suggests 
that, using a combined and complementary environmental justice, just sustainability and 
cosmopolitan democracy (EJJSCD) framework, global south states can advance a human 
rights-based approach to development using monies generated from resource extraction in 
Antarctic waters.  In this framework, environmental justice, just sustainability, and 
cosmopolitan democracy serve as new or emerging paradigms that offer previously untried 
ways of addressing issues of inter and intra-generational equity, democracy beyond borders, 
marginalization of global south states in environmental governance regimes, and lack of 
ongoing capital funding for development projects (both large and small scale) in the global 
south. 
The paper argues that the uncertain legal status of Antarctica, the presence of two separate, 
overlapping legal regimes in the area south of 60º South (the Antarctic Treaty System and the 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)), and rapid technological advances have 
permitted resource extraction in the form of bio-prospecting to occur without appropriate 
environmental governance oversight or regulation.  This opens up opportunities for global 
south states, building both upon the concept of sustainable development embedded in the 
Brundtland Commission report and their common rights and development objectives, to 
collectively press for regulation of the industry and equitable benefit-sharing from resource 
extraction utilizing the EJJSCD framework in order to achieve the vital outcomes outlined in 
the UN Millennium Development Goals. 
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Introduction 
Fourteen years after the establishment of the UN’s Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and one year 
out from their expiry date of 2015, no global South (GS) state has achieved all of its MDG objectives and 
many have fallen far short of the nominated targets (United Nations 2014a, 2014b).  While progress has 
been made in many areas, the collective inability to attain in toto the MDG goals speaks to the complex 
inter-relationship between the different facets of development and, in particular, the links between security, 
human rights, the environment and sustainable development (United Nations 2005). 
As we move further into the 21st century, the propensity of insecurity to undermine development efforts 
has become more apparent.  This is graphically illustrated in the examples of fragile states such as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Sudan which have made little 
progress towards the MDGs (mdgTrack 2014).  The late twentieth century also saw the rise of resource-
based conflict with concomitant disastrous impacts on the lives of peoples affected by those armed 
struggles (Klare 2012; Vision of Humanity 2014).  The vicious cycle of jeopardized human security, rights 
derogation, compromised development, and consequent degradation of human life and the natural 
environment has, unfortunately, become a template only too well known in the global South and its zones 
of instability. 
The starting point for this paper, then, is the need for GS states to break the cycle of insecurity and 
diminished life opportunities, and to progress towards environmentally embedded, rights-based, 
sustainable development for their peoples.  What is suggested in this paper is that a combined and 
complementary environmental justice, just sustainability, and cosmopolitan democracy framework can 
provide a platform from which GS states can collectively press for bio-prospecting governance architecture 
in the Antarctic commons.  The salience of such a proposal is twofold: the need for environmental 
oversight and regulation of a commercial activity in an especially vulnerable commons area to ensure the 
sustainability of affected resources; and the potential for GS states to further their human rights objectives 
and development agendas by benefitting economically from the resource extraction monies generated by 
the bio-prospecting industry and using these as a springboard for development pathways that enhance 
human dignity and freedom. 
This paper is structured into four parts.  Part one outlines the extant governance situation in Antarctica and 
the presence of two different legal regimes with application to Antarctic and Southern Ocean waters, while 
the second part focuses on the concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind and its applicability to GS 
development.  The third part of the paper examines the paradigms of environmental justice, just 
sustainability, and cosmopolitan democracy, and how these can be integrated into a framework that 
provides an enabling nexus for operationalizing an environmentally embedded, rights-situated notion of 
development.  The final section of the paper gives an overview of bio-prospecting and the legal 
uncertainties attaching to bio-prospecting activities in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters, argues the 
value of the EJJSCD framework to GS development via the bio-prospecting mechanism, and finishes by 
briefly noting some caveats and qualifications to this proposal. 
A number of factors are assumed as a basis for analysis and discussion in this paper, and as being 
uncontested in the context of development in the global South.  These are:  
 That in the wake of the global recession there have been worsening inequalities across and within 
many countries and that these have had especially invidious effects upon  global South states 
(Oxfam International 2013; UN DESA 2013; World Bank 2014); 
 that significant investment in development needs to occur in GS states in order to overcome 
metrics of persistent disadvantage manifesting in those states (UNDP  2013b);  
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 that barriers presenting to GS states seeking capital development funds prevent those states from 
initiating comprehensive schemes that could produce enhanced development outcomes and 
indicators of positive progress (United Nations 2003, pp.5-6; UNDESA 2012);  
 that the global North has a common, vested interest in the global South mitigating current 
disparities and inequalities and seeking to close the gap between them (UNDP 2013a; Elliott 2014; 
Puzzanghera 2014); and 
 that development initiatives for the global South need to be sustainable, consistent with both inter 
and intra-generational justice imperatives, and that those involving the natural environment must 
be premised on the precautionary principle (Joyner 2005, pp.207-208). 
 
1. Antarctica, Governance, and Clashing Regimes 
In 1959 the Antarctic Treaty was created by twelve State Parties – Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, 
France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States – and came into effect in 1961 when the last of the twelve ratified the agreement.  The Treaty 
together with subsequent legal instruments and measures collectively form the Antarctic Treaty System 
(ATS).  Those legal instruments and measures include, inter alia, the 1964 Agreed Measures for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora; the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals; 
the 1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, (CCAMLR); the 1988 
Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, the 1991 Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, and the 2004 Agreement on Conservation of Albatrosses 
and Petrels. Under the Treaty a multilateral condominium governance system was established with the 
leading role in governance being taken by the Consultative Parties who are empowered to propose and 
vote on initiatives at the regular Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs).  In 2014 fifty-one 
states are signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, twenty-nine of them being Consultative Parties, with the 
other twenty-one having the status of Contracting Parties (ATS Secretariat 2014).  All pre-existing claims 
to Antarctica - seven at the time of the Treaty’s establishment - were placed in abeyance under Article IV 
of the Treaty, which also prohibits any new claims.  Under the Treaty, Antarctica is designated a peaceful, 
non-militarized area from which nuclear weapons are banned, and as a continent dedicated to international 
scientific cooperation and freedom of scientific investigation (Articles I-III, Antarctic Treaty 1959). 
The ATS forms one regime that applies to Antarctica and Antarctic and Southern Ocean waters.  A second 
regime with application to that region is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982.  The 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is a comprehensive regime for governance 
of the oceans.  It codified customary international law and its development over the previous century to 
create a regime that established clear rules about national sovereignty and maritime zones.  UNCLOS 
came into effect in 1994 and by 2013 had been ratified by 166 states, including all Antarctic Treaty State 
Parties, bar the USA which has signed but not ratified the Convention (UNDOLS 2013).  A notable feature 
of UNCLOS is its designation of The Area – that part of the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil beyond 
national jurisdiction – and its resources as comprising the Common Heritage of Mankind (Article 136, 
UNCLOS 1982).  As a Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM), The Area is not subject to appropriation, 
sovereign claims, or the exercise of sovereignty over any of its parts. Furthermore, conduct by states in 
The Area is required to comport not only with the specific provisions of UNCLOS and other rules of 
international law, but also the ‘principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations’ (Article 138, 
UNCLOS).  Part XI of UNCLOS lays out a protocol and process for activities in The Area which, 
according to Article 140, are to be ‘carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the 
geographical location of States, whether coastal or land-locked, and taking into particular consideration the 
interests and needs of developing States’.  UNCLOS established the International Seabed Authority (the 
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Authority) to ‘provide for the equitable sharing of financial and other economic benefits derived from 
activities in the Area through any appropriate mechanism, on a non-discriminatory basis’ (Article 140, 
UNCLOS).  Additionally, the Authority is vested with a special mandate to carry out activities in The Area  
in such a manner as to foster healthy development of the world economy and balanced growth of 
international trade, and to promote international cooperation for the over-all development of all 
countries, especially developing States (Article 150, UNCLOS). 
Both the ATS and UNCLOS have application in Antarctic and Southern Ocean waters. The ATS 
instruments generally follow either the application areas of the Antarctic Treaty or of CCAMLR.  In 
Article V, the geographical parameters of application of the Antarctic Treaty are specified as ‘south of 60° 
South Latitude, including all ice shelves’ (Article VI, Antarctic Treaty 1959). The CCAMLR area of 
application is ‘the area south of 60° South latitude and to….the area between that latitude and the Antarctic 
Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem’ (Article I, CCAMLR). UNCLOS, by 
contrast, was intended to create ‘a legal order for the seas and oceans’ (Preamble, UNCLOS), so was 
anticipated to be employed across the globe by states as an international blueprint for oceans governance.  
Consequently, there is no clear demarcation between the regimes in respect to the areas over which the two 
agreements hold sway.  As Rothwell (1994, p.156) has noted, a number ‘of the provisions of UNCLOS are 
important for Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, particularly those dealing with expanded maritime zones 
and the deep seabed’.   For instance, although claims to sovereignty are frozen under the provisions of 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, several Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs) can be described 
as coastal states in proximity to the southernmost continent and are theoretically entitled, under the 
extended continental shelves provisions of UNCLOS (Article 76 and Annex II, UNCLOS), to expand their 
maritime jurisdiction into the waters surrounding Antarctica. Additionally, because The Area is deemed a 
CHM under UNCLOS, deep seabed mining may be countenanced as an activity that could occur in those 
same waters.  This has created a tension between the position taken by Antarctic Treaty signatory states 
that the ATS acts on behalf of the international community in a stewardship role for Antarctica and its 
surrounding waters, and the status of UNCLOS as a ‘constitution for the oceans’ that celebrates ‘human 
solidarity and the reality of interdependence’ (Koh 1982, p.xxxvii).  The situation is further complicated, 
firstly by the fact that under international law neither agreement trumps the other and, secondly, by the 
uneasy state of southern polar politics with its blend of both national and ‘common interests in the 
international space of Antarctica’ (Berkman 2010, p.7).  In this latter context, Rayfuse (2008, p.1) has 
observed the ‘jostle’ among ATS parties, and between the parties and ‘the rest of the international 
community over control of the great white continent and its surrounding Southern Ocean’.  Elliott (1994) 
has noted the imperial origins of the Antarctic Treaty, and Chaturvedi (1996), Dodds (2006), Scott (2011) 
and Elzinga (2012) have commented on the neo or postcolonial overtones evident in the contemporary 
ATS, a situation exacerbated by the ‘sovereignty performances’ (Dodds 2011, p.231) in which claimant 
states still engage.  Finally, and against this background, it should be acknowledged that Antarctica’s 
critical environmental importance has become increasingly recognized over time as ongoing scientific 
research has revealed the vital roles and functions it plays in the global biosphere - for instance, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007, p.655) noted that the Arctic and Antarctic were ‘the 
regions with the greatest potential to affect global climate and thus human populations and biodiversity.’   
2. The Common Heritage of Mankind and Global South Development 
Antarctica is frequently cited as one of the global commons along with the oceans, outer space and the 
atmosphere (Vogler 1995; Buck 1998).  According to Joyner (2005, p.224) global common spaces are 
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those domains that lie beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of any state but which may be used by 
states or their nationals for their own purposes, such as resource extraction, waste disposal, or 
scientific research. 
Analogous to the concept of global commons spaces is the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM).  The 
CHM was introduced in UNCLOS and referenced in relation to Antarctica by GS states during the early 
1980s when the ‘Question of Antarctica’ was placed on the agenda of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations.  Although there is no universally accepted definition of the CHM, Shackleton (2008, p.103) notes 
that there appear to be five common elements: 
First, there can be no private or public appropriation of the commons. Second, representatives 
from all nations must manage resources since a commons area is considered to belong to 
everyone. Third, all nations must actively share in the benefits acquired from exploitation of the 
resources from the common heritage region. Fourth, there can be no weaponry or military 
installations established in commons areas. Fifth, the commons should be preserved for the benefit 
of future generations. 
In both the global commons and the CHM, the collective ownership by humanity of designated spaces and 
access to those spaces are core ideas.  This is explicitly buttressed in the CHM by the notion of inclusive 
controlled management of such common spaces in order to preserve them for humankind in the future - a 
corollary of the late twentieth century consciousness of the carrying capacity of the earth, accelerated 
degradation of natural resources, shared obligations to prevent a ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1967), 
and increasing acceptance of the concept of sustainable development, defined in the World Commission 
on Economic Development (WCED) Report (1987, p.43) as ‘development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’. 
This cluster of ideas around the CHM as a common patrimony of humankind helped inform global South 
activism about the status of Antarctica in the UN in the 1980s.  Building upon the naming in UNCLOS of 
The Area as a CHM, and the instructions in the Preamble about utilization of this CHM, ‘the exploration 
and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, irrespective of the 
geographical location of States’ (Preamble, UNCLOS), the applicability of the CHM concept to Antarctica 
was asserted strongly by a Malaysian-led bloc of GS states (UN General Assembly 1984, pp.34-38). It 
was, however, opposed equally strongly by the ATCPs who also rejected the simultaneous, linked claims 
made by GS states about the Antarctic decision-making group as being unrepresentative, exclusive and 
exclusionary, secretive, undemocratic, racist, and as having created a club of rich, western members with 
privileged access to what was expected to be a forthcoming mining bonanza in Antarctica (Beck 1985, 
1986, 1989). 
The period since then has not seen the ATCPs resile from the position that Antarctica is not a CHM, 
despite the presence among the Consultative Party group from 1983 (India) and 1985 (China) of the two 
largest GS states.  Indeed, after a series of internal changes to ATS governance which helped satisfy some 
of the grievances enunciated by the GS states in their critique of the Antarctic regime, and the creation in 
1991 of a Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty that banned mining in the continent for fifty years, the ‘Question 
of Antarctica’ was removed from the agenda of the General Assembly in 2006.  Although it is formally a 
matter of which the Assembly ‘remains seized’, it is no longer a lightning rod for protest by GS states in 
the UN, and the contention that Antarctica should be deemed a CHM has not been subsequently invoked in 
that forum.  Instead, India and China were able to take advantage of the changes made by the ATCPs in 
response to the GS critique in the UN to enter the decision-making group and themselves become ATCPs.  
Additionally, the international community of states generally has benefitted from the greater openness and 
information-sharing about ATS governance, and the transformation of South Africa, one of the founding 
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ATCPs, from an apartheid state to a multicultural democracy from 1994, helped ease criticisms about 
racism and the undemocratic nature of the Antarctic governance leadership.  Nevertheless, it should not be 
assumed that GS states have ceased to be concerned about the legal status of Antarctica, or that a period of 
quietude in international fora about the CHM concept has eliminated consideration about the potential of 
Antarctic resources to help drive GS development.  Rather, a confluence of facilitative factors suggest that 
the possibility of naming Antarctica as a CHM should be revisited, and that such nomination would be 
important in providing a legal foundation to establish a universally applicable bio-prospecting regime with 
equitable benefit-sharing provisions. These factors include: the colonial nature of claims on Antarctica and 
ongoing issues related to those claims; the concepts of environmental rights and environmental justice 
(explored in more detail later in the paper); ‘contemporary understandings of interdependence and shared 
trans-boundary problems; and the idea of intra-generational justice and its links to global south 
development’ (Verbitsky 2014).   
At the time that the Antarctic Treaty was instituted, seven sovereign claims, comprising eighty percent of 
the continent, had been made by Argentina (1943), Australia (1933), Chile (1940), France (1924), New 
Zealand (1923), Norway (1939), and the United Kingdom (1908 & 1917). Additionally, both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, although not recognising the claims made by the other states, themselves 
reserved the right to make claims upon Antarctica in the future (Stonehouse 2000, pp.250-253).  The seven 
pre-Treaty claims are recognised only by other members of the claimant group, with the exception of the 
UK, Chile and Argentina.  The sectoral claims of these three countries in Antarctica overlap, and the 
conflict between them in the 1950s over their competing claims became sufficiently grave to cause the UK 
to seek an ultimately failed attempt at arbitration by the International Court of Justice (Dodds 2012, p.55).  
The establishment of the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, then, was a timely intervention that helped prevent 
further escalation of the conflict between the three countries, and also made Antarctica an off-limits area in 
the superpower conflict of the Cold War.  Despite this, Article IV’s freezing of pre-existing sovereign 
claims has not prevented claimant states engaging in actions that reinforce their claims, despite the claims 
officially being suspended while the Treaty is in force.  As the claims themselves have not been 
extinguished, they would once again become live should the Treaty be terminated or become defunct.  
However, since 1959 more and more national research stations and bases have been built across all the 
claimed sectors of Antarctica, an element that makes it difficult to see how the claims could actually be 
enforced, especially in light of the argument made  by Brady (2012, p.454) that because no states have 
objected to the situation whereby for more than half a century each state with a permanent research base in 
Antarctica has acted ‘as if their bases are sovereign territory’ and has applied ‘their national laws there, 
including the right to exclude others’, this ‘amounts to local customary law, independent of the Antarctic 
Treaty’.  Adding to this is the modern distaste for claims to sovereignty staked in colonial times.  The 
UN’s sponsorship of decolonization was reinforced by Resolution 1514(XV) of 1960, the Declaration on 
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which states that the ‘peoples of the 
world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations’ and proclaims ‘the necessity of 
bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’. The 
Declaration states that ‘Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the 
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
United Nations’.  It has been argued (Verbitsky 2014) that despite ‘the lack of an indigenous population or 
‘dependent peoples’, the Declaration has application ‘to the sovereign claims upon Antarctica through the 
breaches of territorial integrity of the continent that they represent, and the determination of claimant states 
to subjugate and impose their alien will upon the southernmost land’. 
Environmental rights and environmental justice link to the idea of Antarctica as a CHM through their 
recognition that there is a reinforcing connection between human rights and the environment, the 
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distribution of environmental ills and reduced life opportunities, and global inequities and rights 
derogations.  This reflects key aspects of Principles 1and 2 of the Declaration of United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, 1972: 
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an 
environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn 
responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations… 
The natural resources of the earth, including the air, water, land, flora and fauna and especially 
representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and 
future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate. 
Intra-generational justice and GS development are relevant in this context because of their complementary 
focus on contemporary inequalities and the need to pro-actively intervene to try and meet the needs of the 
world’s poorest peoples.  Similarly, interdependence and shared trans-boundary problems underscore ‘the 
increased global awareness of humankind’s common vulnerability to environmental degradation, and the 
importance of Antarctica to the earth’s ecosystem’ (Verbitsky 2014), factors which emphasize the primacy 
of the relationship between humankind and the environment, and recognise that human rights are 
ecologically embedded.  Within this frame of reference, then, the notion of an Antarctic CHM in which 
bio-prospecting occurs via an established governance system with equitable benefit-sharing has 
tractability. 
3. Cosmopolitan Democracy, Environmental Justice, Just Sustainability, Development and 
Human Rights 
 
In the ‘century of the environment’ (Lubchenko 1998), environmental justice, just sustainability and 
cosmopolitan democracy offer both important theoretical insights and practical pathways for addressing 
the inequalities, marginalization and lack of voice experienced by GS states in global governance, and the 
need to achieve sustainable development that is founded on ecologically embedded human rights.  
 
Cosmopolitan democracy ‘attempts to specify the principles and the institutional arrangements for making 
accountable those sites and forms of power that presently operate beyond the scope of democratic control’ 
(Held, McGrew, Goldblatt & Perraton 1999,  p.449).  It recognizes the reality of citizens as members of 
diverse multiple communities across the local, national, regional and global levels, and the disconnection 
experienced by those citizens as a consequence of the democratic deficit engendered through hollowing 
out of the state and the lack of accountability and democratic participation in increasingly globalized 
governance systems.  Cosmopolitan democracy thus propounds the need for equivalence between decision-
makers and decision-takers in order that ‘those who are significantly affected by a global good or bad 
should have a say in its provision or regulation’ (Held 2007, p.248).   
Environmental justice has entangled roots in social movements and local campaigns centered on issues of 
recognition, protection and equality for marginalized communities, and in public policy contestation over 
the problematic distribution of environmental ills, which ‘mirrors the inequity in socio-economic and 
cultural status’ (Schlosberg 1999, p.12). It emphasizes that because inequity in distribution of the 
environmental ills and lack of recognition by affected communities in the political process are inextricably 
linked, justice ‘requires both redistribution and recognition’ (Fraser quoted in Schlosberg 1999, p.13). 
Specifically, environmental justice requires ‘equity in the distribution of environmental risk, recognition of 
the diversity of the participants and experiences in affected communities, and participation in the political 
processes which create and manage environmental policy’ (Schlosberg 2004, p.517). Environmental 
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justice thus nominates sustainable development as its overarching public policy goal and stresses the 
importance of pluralistic forms of justice to achieve real social justice. 
Just sustainability has similar starting points to environmental justice in its focus on justice, the 
environment and sustainability.  However, just sustainability departs from environmental justice in 
perceiving problems in sustainable development praxis that lead to an imbalance between inter and intra-
generational equity, and subsequent ‘equity deficit’ with the latter (Agyeman 2008, p.752).  Just 
sustainability, therefore, reframes environmental justice to equally weight justice and equity within 
sustainability discourse and policy, linking these together as one of the four key elements - quality of life; 
present and future generations; justice and equity; and living within ecosystem limits - to form the 
foundational basis of the paradigm (Agyeman 2008, p. 755). 
Although differing in their orientations and prescriptions for change, the three paradigms commonly 
recognize the limitations of extant governance systems in a globalized world to address or substantively 
engage with core problems identified by them to do with justice, equity, recognition, participation and 
representation.  All three identify problems with the invidious assertion of power by elites over 
communities that, lacking means of redress, cannot rectify the situation and, consequently, suffer ongoing 
burdens of disadvantage and deprivation.  These problems increasingly manifest, through the lens of 
cosmopolitan democracy, in the inability of individual states to deal with complex trans-boundary 
problems, such as climate change, and in the alienation of communities from a political order that lacks 
democratic representation and participation channels in which they have a voice.  In the environmental 
justice framework, the liberal individualist conception of distributive justice constrains the integration of 
redistribution, recognition, and public participation needed to prevent environmental inequities being 
disproportionately distributed among communities.  It also perpetuates the negative effects of 
environmental ills because of its focus on distributive justice while neglecting the existing underlying poor 
distributions of social goods.  Just sustainability, meanwhile, focuses on the harms caused by decoupling 
equity and justice within sustainable development, and the recognition that a transformative vision of 
sustainability is both an objective and conduit for social justice: 
A truly sustainable society is one where wider questions of social needs and welfare, and 
economic opportunity, are integrally related to environmental limits imposed by supporting 
ecosystems. This emphasis upon greater equity as a desirable and just social goal, is intimately 
linked to a recognition that, unless society strives for a greater level of social and economic equity, 
both within and between nations, the long-term objective of a more sustainable world is unlikely 
to be secured (Agyeman, Bullard & Evans 2002, p.78). 
 
Individually, each of the three paradigms provides powerful contributions to critiques of the dynamics of 
power in the governor/governed relationships of the 21st century. Each also offers an agenda for change, 
with environmental justice and just sustainability having particularly well-established records of praxis.  
What is suggested here, though, is that in the context of Antarctica and the GS, cosmopolitan democracy, 
environmental justice and just sustainability can be combined into a complementary, interlinking and 
mutually reinforcing framework that would serve as an enabling nexus, providing the GS with an 
ideational basis for asserting the need for change in the status of Antarctica and the introduction of bio-
prospecting architecture incorporating equitable benefit-sharing. 
 
The utility and efficacy of this approach is that it addresses key problematic aspects of the current 
situation: a contested space subject to two separate, overlapping legal regimes whose marine-based 
resources could be used to help drive GS development.  Cosmopolitan democracy provides support for the 
idea of asserting a greater presence for the GS in the Antarctic governance domain, including space for 
trans-national NGOS and civil society organizations to represent the voices of those who have not 
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previously been heard in that setting.  The principle of equivalence between decision-makers and decision-
takers helps frame the GS as decision-takers entitled to participate in the decision-making that integrally 
affects them and their future.  Environmental justice also gives support for the recognition and 
participation of the GS in Antarctic decision-making fora, and the emphasis given in the paradigm to 
recognizing the underlying poor distributions provides a strong basis for asserting the need to help rectify 
this through bio-prospecting in the Antarctic commons.  The superordinacy of sustainable development in 
environmental justice indicates that bio-prospecting would be permitted only as consistent with 
sustainability limitations, and thus subject to enforced caps to protect the viability of those resources and 
their situated environment for future generations.  Additionally, the recognition in the environmental 
justice paradigm of disparities and inequalities relating to class, race, gender, environment and social 
justice form firm foundations for advancing a change programme with Antarctica and bio-prospecting that 
links to the notion of a commons space and CHM as engines for GS development.  The just sustainability 
paradigm reinforces the idea that intra-generational equity is equally important as inter-generational equity, 
and so there is a strong claim for GS states to use bio-prospecting in Antarctic waters to help remedy 
current day inequities (the underlying poor distributions) and achieve a truly global sustainability 
predicated on recognition, representation, participation, equity, and social justice. The just sustainability 
acknowledgment of ‘The need to ensure a better quality of life for all, now and into the future, in a just and 
equitable manner, while living within the limits of supporting ecosystems’ (Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 
2003) brings into sharper focus the correlation between the disproportionately allocated environmental 
risks and burdens suffered by GS states, lack of voice of the marginalized GS in global governance 
systems, the multiple indices of disadvantage and deprivation of the GS evidencing the underlying poor 
distributions, and the consequent diminished capabilities of GS communities. It crystallizes the 
connections between environmental ills, GS states, and lack of capabilities, underscoring the fundamental 
relationship between humans and the environment, and the crucial importance of the environment to 
achieve human rights and ‘a public order of human dignity’ (McDougal quoted in Weston and Bollier 
2013, p.123).  And, like environmental justice, it also recognizes a duty of care to the environment and the 
need for limitations to activities impacting ‘supporting ecosystems’. 
 
In short, the combined cosmopolitan democracy, environmental justice and just sustainability (CDEJJS) 
framework weaves together the procedural and substantive aspects of equity and justice necessary to gird 
about a capabilities-based approach to development grounded in ecologically-embedded human rights (the 
truly sustainable society).  Enmeshing the three paradigms in this way provides a politico-structural frame 
for application to the Antarctic context that, because of the complex, multi-layered nature of the 
problematics there, is philosophically stronger than using one or other paradigm alone.  It also provides a 
supporting agenda for action across different levels (local, national, regional, global) and within different 
domains (economic, social, cultural, political) that allows for ‘movement fusion’ and the building of 
strategic alliances and blocs to facilitate and progress the goals of naming of Antarctica as a CHM and the 
introduction of a bio-prospecting governance regime that incorporates equitable benefit-sharing. 
 
This CDEJJS approach incorporates the ‘inescapable fact that humans are ecologically embedded beings’ 
(Barry and Woods 2013, p.381).  It takes as a given that humans are simultaneously grounded in the 
environment and dependent on it for survival. Therefore, the environment is ‘prerequisite to the enjoyment 
of human rights’ (Barry and Woods 2013, p.381) and creation of social justice, just as the human duty of 
care and protection of the environment is fundamental to ensuring unimpaired functioning and longevity of 
the natural world. Further, the mutually dependent relationship between the environment and human rights 
acknowledges that threats to one impact on the other to their joint detriment.  It also recognizes that 
insecurity compromises and jeopardizes both human capabilities and environmental functioning by 
undermining or removing the conditions in which humans can flourish and the environment can be 
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protected.  The relationships between the environment, rights, and social justice are, consequently, seen as 
inherent, fundamental and inseparable. 
 
4. Bio-Prospecting in the Southern Ocean and Antarctic Waters 
Bio-prospecting is ‘a range of activities associated with the search for novel biodiversity, whose 
component parts may then be utilized in a product or process and developed for commercialization’ 
(Rogan Finnemore 2005, p.3). The extreme conditions of Antarctica have evoked interest from 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies for bio-prospecting in Antarctic waters in order to discover 
the adaptations that biota have made to survive the conditions, and how these unique biochemical and 
genetic materials may be harnessed for commercial applications.  According to Farrell & Duncan (2005, 
pp.25-26) antifreeze proteins are one of the best known bio-prospecting successes.  Currently, there is 
considerable interest in krill.  As an Information Paper presented to the 2012 ATCM noted, ‘Twelve of the 
twenty-two patent applications granted between 2010 and 2012 relate to krill’ and include the use of krill 
extracts and oils in prevention and treatment of diseases such as cancer, diabetes, and arthritis (Netherlands 
et al 2012, p.3). 
It is only recently that the economic potential of marine genetic resources has garnered attention, a 
consequence Beslier (2009, p.334) observes of ‘the combination of two recent developments: progress in 
knowledge of deep-sea ecosystems and emergence of biotechnology as a major source of industrial and 
commercial innovation’.  In just a short period bio-prospecting ‘has become a global multi-billion dollar 
industry’ (Connolly-Stone 2005, p.69). A 2007 report stated that ‘The industry generates over US$60 
billion in revenue and has created hundreds of products in the area of human health alone’ (UNEP 2007 
IP63, ATCM, p.14).  Recent research specifies that ‘the global market for marine biotechnology products 
and processes is estimated at € 2.8 billion for 2010’ (Jorem 2012, p.1, fn. 5). However, bio-prospecting is 
neither a quick nor easy road to riches.  The four phases of the bio-prospecting process – sample 
collection; isolation, characterization and culture; screening for pharmaceutical activity; development of 
product, patenting, trials, sales and marketing – are time-consuming, extremely expensive and there is no 
guarantee of success.  Nevertheless, the potential for profit in bio-prospecting is such that bio-prospecting 
activities by universities, research centres, biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies – often working 
in consortia - have been occurring in Antarctic and Southern Ocean waters since the late 1980s 
(Hemmings, 2010, p.5). 
 
Bio-prospecting first appeared on an ATCM agenda in 1999 (Hemmings 2010, p.5) and has, since the mid-
2000s been a regular agenda item at the annual meetings of the Consultative Parties to the Antarctic 
Treaty.  Two resolutions relating to bio-prospecting have been agreed at ATCMs, the first in Stockholm in 
2005 (Resolution 7), the second in Baltimore in 2009 (Resolution 9).  These resolutions pertain to 
information-sharing among State Parties about bio-prospecting activities by national Antarctic 
programmes and research centres (Resolution 7), and information-sharing about the collection and use of 
Antarctic biological material by governments of State Parties (Resolution 9). To date (August 2014), no 
action has been taken by the Antarctic Treaty members to establish a regulatory framework for bio-
prospecting activities in the area covered by the ATS instruments. 
 
The absence of an ATS regulatory framework for bio-prospecting is compounded by the legal gaps relating 
to bio-prospecting beyond areas of national jurisdiction either in UNCLOS or in the Convention on 
Biological Diversity 1992 (CBD) and Nagoya Protocol 2010.  De la Fayette (2009, p.224) notes that 
UNCLOS dates from a period when issues of marine biodiversity were not considered important and 
marine genetic resources were almost unknown, so the convention only briefly mentions the former and 
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does not mention the latter at all.  Because of the lack of regulation or designation of a special zone in 
UNCLOS of bio-prospecting, the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters, therefore, can be viewed as a high 
seas area (‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or 
in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State’,  according to 
Article 86 of UNCLOS) and so ‘open to all States, whether coastal or land-locked’ to engage in a variety 
of activities including ‘freedom of scientific research’ (Article 87, UNCLOS). 
Originating in a later era, the CBD, introduced at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, is the most 
comprehensive international agreement dealing with biodiversity, and its three objectives – ‘conservation 
of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources’ – cover the critical issues associated with bio-prospecting 
matters (UNEP 2011, p.1).  The CBD also pays particular attention to GS states and sustainable 
development, as the Preamble makes clear in its statement that ‘special provision is required to meet the 
needs of developing countries, including the provision of new and additional financial resources and 
appropriate access to relevant technologies’, and ‘that economic and social development and poverty 
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries’.   However, the CBD deals only 
with ‘components of biological diversity’ in maritime zones (the territorial sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone) under the jurisdiction of states (CBD, Article 4a).  It does not, therefore, cover areas beyond national 
jurisdictions and so the Southern Ocean and Antarctic waters also lie outside the scope of this convention. 
The problems that arise from this state of affairs are neatly encapsulated by Jabour (2012, p.242): 
…bioprospecting in the Antarctic does not have clarity about jurisdictional scope, regulatory 
status, access arrangements, environmental implications, commercial use of material and 
information or benefit-sharing….bioprospecting is already happening, patents are being filed and 
products developed – all within a legal and administrative vacuum. 
Therein lies the rub.  Bio-prospecting has been taking place for almost a quarter of a century in an area of 
the world central to the global eco-system where, due to the separate, overlapping UNCLOS and ATS 
regimes, there is no legal clarity or certainty about the regulation of bio-prospecting activities, and no 
mechanisms to safeguard the fragile environment or ensure sustainable protection of marine resources.  
Inevitably, commercial entities have stepped into the vacuum and undertaken entrepreneurial ventures in 
bio-prospecting.   
 
What is suggested in this paper is a two-pronged process: the declaration of Antarctica and its waters as a 
CHM; and the construction of a bio-prospecting governance scheme that regulates activities and includes 
an equitable benefit-sharing scheme.  While the declaration of Antarctica as a CHM is not a strict 
prerequisite to the instigation of a bio-prospecting governance scheme, it would be preferable to achieve 
this prior to introducing bio-prospecting architecture in order to settle the status of Antarctica and to 
provide legal and political clarity about the rules governing bio-prospecting.  The ‘vacuum’ in this area and 
the lack of convergence between the ATS and UNCLOS regimes permits unregulated, unchecked bio-
prospecting activity to occur, something that is wholly undesirable from the viewpoint of sustainability and 
marine environmental protection.  It is also less than optimal in terms of political and legal confusion about 
the duties, obligations and rights of states and, increasingly, non-state actors, in the Antarctic and Southern 
Ocean waters.  The current state of affairs privileges those entities with the capacity, financial resources, 
and entrepreneurial abilities to exploit what is, effectively, a giant loophole in the global marine 
environmental regulatory domain.  It underscores the dangers of inaction by the ATS regime in bio-
prospecting, the inability of UNCLOS to manage an activity not specifically demarcated and ring-fenced in 
the convention and, consequently, the contemporary risks from unregulated invasive activity to which the 
marine environment and resources are being subjected.  It also sends signals to commercial bio-
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prospecting entities that for as long as there is divergence between the ATS and UNCLOS over the status 
of Antarctica, they will be able to operate without restraint.  Ideally, the ATCPs (particularly the seven 
claimant states) need to be included in a bio-prospecting governance scheme that involves the white 
continent.  Not only would their expertise and leadership be extremely valuable in respect to the southern 
polar region, but their active participation would send a strong message about the determination of the 
international community to collaboratively protect the marine environment and regulate activities in the 
sector, an important consideration given the presence of non-state actors involved in bio-prospecting.  
Absent their participation, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean waters are more and more likely to be 
perceived, for the purposes of bio-prospecting, as high seas zones, open to all for exploitation and 
untrammeled profiteering.  Such a scenario would inevitably endanger the marine environment and 
resources, vanquish any hope of marine sustainability in the area south of 60̊ South, ruin prospects for inter 
and intra-generational justice engendered from commercial activities in these areas and, because of the 
vital role of Antarctica in the biosphere, significantly compromise the essential human-nature relationship. 
 
What could be gained from the introduction of a CHM status for Antarctica and the initiation of bio-
prospecting governance regime with equitable benefit-sharing is a potential springboard for development 
by GS states.  Bio-prospecting revenue offers a possible route away from petitioner status with 
international financial institutions to autonomy, authority and agency for GS states in capital financing of 
development programmes, both large and small-scale.  In this context, bio-prospecting would be 
invaluable in helping provide GS states with a means to self-determination in the development sphere.  It 
could act as an engine to jump-start development projects currently unable to be financed because of cost 
factors, and enable GS states to help practically create the conditions to lift the life opportunities for their 
peoples.  Because of the inherent links between development, human rights and the environment, bio-
prospecting also offers a means to enhance and progress the human rights of peoples of the GS and 
safeguard the natural environment.  As the World Commission on Environment and Development 
recognized, ‘a reduction in poverty itself is a precondition for ecologically sound development’ (quoted in 
Gillespie 1997, p.175). Similarly, the designation of Antarctica as a CHM would help fulfill, albeit 
belatedly, the promise of the MDGs of ‘making the right to development a reality for everyone and to 
freeing the entire human race from want’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 2000, Article 11).  It would 
recognize the ability of all states to be involved in decision-making about the future of the continent, and 
the rights of all states – tempered by the precautionary principle and sustainability precepts – to gain access 
to Antarctic and Southern Ocean waters to facilitate, via bio-prospecting, intra-generational justice and a 
route to closing the gap between global North and South. 
 
The practical politics of implementing this proposal are beyond the scope of this paper.  It is possible, 
however, to limn some caveats and qualifications to the proposal.  Firstly, the fact that bio-prospecting has 
been taking place for more than two decades in the area south of 60 ̊ South means that there are already 
vested commercial interests at play, making it harder to introduce regulations about bio-prospecting 
without an international community willing to act in a cohesive and united manner about the issue.  The 
extant difficulties of achieving compliance and enforcement of international law in respect to third parties 
that are non-state entities would be seriously exacerbated by lack of unanimity among states on this matter.  
Secondly, a very real problem with bio-prospecting is where and how to draw the line between ‘pure’ 
scientific research and commercial application of scientific research.  In a related vein, there is the 
associated difficulty of attempting to separate out commercial and non-commercial entities among 
scientific consortia as most involve universities or academic institutions and agencies.  In this context, the 
prioritization of cooperative international scientific research in the Antarctic Treaty and information-
sharing adds another dimension of complexity.  A further problem lies with extant collections of marine 
genetic resources and materials, their ownership, and access to the collections.  Lastly, a question must 
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also be raised in relation to the amount of monies that may be generated from bio-prospecting, and the time 
frame in which the monies may be accrued.  As Lodge (2012, p.741) has noted, ‘unlike minerals, genetic 
resources themselves are not valuable—rather it is the product of extensive research and development that 
may be valuable’.  Revenue generation from bio-prospecting in the Antarctic commons should not, 
therefore, be seen as quick path to economic liberation by GS states or as some panacea for the problems 
of international development financing but, rather, as a scenario that offers long-term opportunities for GS 
states in financing development schemes that would help provide lives of greater dignity and freedom for 
their people. 
 
Conclusion 
In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the time may now be ripe for serious consideration of two 
related issues – the declaration of Antarctica as a CHM, and the introduction of a bio-prospecting 
governance regime that includes equitable benefit-sharing.  While the idea of an Antarctic commons is not 
a new one, the emergence over the last quarter century of the cosmopolitan democracy, environmental 
justice and just sustainability paradigms - which speak directly to issues of justice, participation, 
recognition and equity - provides a spur to reconsider the importance of the CHM concept and its potential 
for advancing common GS development and rights agendas. The MDG goals have been helpful in both 
focusing attention on the prime needs of the GS and stimulating efforts in specific domains, but in the long 
term even greater energies will need to be expended to fulfill the promise of the ‘fundamental 
values…essential to international relations in the twenty-first century’: freedom; equality; solidarity; 
tolerance; respect for nature; and shared responsibility (UNGAR 2000, p.2). 
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